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Abstract  
This study provides an in-depth analysis of the value chain governance in the fruit 
sector in Albania. Particular attention was paid to the nature of relations between 
agricultural producers and marketing channel chosen by them, distinguishing 
between big wholesalers, local collectors and exporters, longer-term relations, 
commitment and trust, and contracting along the value chain. Given the absence of, 
or weak, contract enforcement and the clear evidence of embeddedness in dyadic 
relationships in this chain, we focused our analysis on sustained relationships, 
contracting and personal bonds as a determinant factor to improve business 
relationship quality. This paper is based on a structured survey targeting 182 orchard 
farmers in two leading fruit production regions in Albania, namely Korca and 
Peshkopia. The survey showed a weak prevalence of verbal contracts in embedded 
relationships. The percentage of contracts between farmers and local collectors is 
slightly higher compared to wholesalers. This evidence is much stronger when we 
investigate the incidence of contracts in stable relationships (i.e. selling to the same 
buyer). We also find that mature relationships generate higher sustainability - a result 
which does not come as a surprise, although the coordination between farmers and 
other actors downstream is only at early stages. The main implications which arise 
from our analysis are relevant for agribusinesses, farmers and policy makers. 
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Introduction 
Fruit production is one of the most important and fastest growing agriculture 
subsectors in Albania, growing by almost 3/4 since 2007 (MARDWA, 2014). The 
orchard sector has also been considered an important and priority sector by the 
Albanian government (MAFCP, 2007; MARDWA 2014).  
Apple production is an important activity for Albanian horticulture. In terms of 
cultivated area, apples are the most important fruit - followed by figs and grapes, 
respectively. On the demand side, apples account for the second highest expenditure 
of households in terms of on all fruits and vegetables combined, following tomatoes 
(USAID’s AAC 2008). This can be explained by the fact that apples are widespread 
and easy to store for a long time. They can be cultivated in different climate 
conditions and there is a long local tradition in both the production and consumption 
of apples.  
Apple production has increased substantially since 2000, having more than 
quadrupled between 2000 and 2010 (Table 1). Furthermore, it is expected to further 
increase in the coming years, because of recent plantations stimulated by the 
investment support scheme. This scheme has been introduced by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Consumer Protection (MAFCP), and motivated by a high 
domestic consumer demand. 
Table 1: Dynamics of production and gross supply of apple 
Category   2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Production  Mt 12,000 36,000 45,000 47,202 54,604 56,000 71,300 
Import  Mt 28,163 22,516 15,641 12,928 17,702 11,399 11,469 
Export  Mt 0 147 34 109 1,097 2,323   4,309 
Supply   Mt 40,163 58,369 60,607 60,022 71,209 66,399 78,460 
Export/import  % 0.0% 0.7% 0.2% 0.8% 6.2% 20.3% 37.6% 
Production/supply  % 29.9% 61.5% 59.1% 78.6% 76.7% 84.3% 90.9% 
Import/supply  % 70.1% 38.6% 41.0% 21.5% 24.9% 17.1% 14.6% 
Source: FAO (production), UNSTAT (import – export), *MAFCP 
Actors in of the value chain 
Farmers - Orchard production is highly fragmented, while most farms have mixed 
activity and semi-subsistence orientation. There are more than 60 thousand farmers 
that have orchard plantations – however most of them have 0.2 ha or less (see Table 
3). Orchard cultivating surface is growing fast due to the increasing market demand, 
availability of subsidy schemes for plantations and enhanced farm experience – as a 
trend which also impacts the increase of the average orchard plantation size. 
Wholesalers – i) Consolidators and local collectors are the first linkage point between 
the farms and the market, be it for final consumption locally, export or for processing 
other derivative products.  Sometimes local collectors also import if provided with 
favourable terms. 
ii) Other Wholesalers – operate as the main buyers from farmers, while imports are 
sourced from larger importers. These actors occasionally import fruit and vegetables, 
including apples, from neighbouring countries. They have their own transport 
vehicles (usually not refrigerated), most often a two-ton mini-van or a five-ton truck. 
Iii) Exporters. Usually the function of the export is carried out by importers or one of 
the above categories of players, often on sporadic basis, or traders from the region 
come and import directly from Albania.  
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Retailers – (i) Supermarket chains. Supermarket chains have been introduced only 
recently in Albania (in mid-2000’).  At present, supermarket chains play a minor role 
in fruit sale – only 5% of consumers in Tirana buy apples mainly at supermarkets 
(Imami et al, 2012). This figure may be much lower in smaller towns, in which 
supermarket chains are not the norm, yet. (ii) Green markets. Most fruit and 
vegetables are sold on (specialised) green markets (GTZ, 2010). Most consumers 
(56%) in Tirana buy apples on the green market (Imami et al, 2012). (iii) 
Convenience shops. In every neighbourhood and close to every large residential 
building, there are convenience shops. Many such units sell fresh fruit and 
vegetables – sales are usually in low quantities, and are often more expensive and of 
lower quality (less fresh) as compared to the green markets.  
The objective of this research is to analyse the market access choices of orchard 
farmers in Albania.  Particular attention is paid to the nature of relations between 
farmers and the marketing channel chosen by them. The paper is organised in three 
sections in addition to this one. Section 2 consists of theoretical background and 
methods. Section 3 reflects the empirical research findings, while Section 4 provides 
the discussion of the results, conclusions and recommendations. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) is one of the most frequent, theoretical frameworks 
in the research of business relationships (Heide, 1994; Joshi & Stump, 1999). This 
theory has evolved from a number of authors, studies and articles concerning 
different subject areas including economic literature, organizational theory, and law 
literature.   
Reduction of opportunism is recognized to be a key purpose of transaction 
governance. The transaction cost economics focuses on opportunistic behaviour as a 
constant in transactions between buyers and suppliers, and its variation can be 
explained by characteristics of the transaction (the level of uncertainty, the likelihood 
of recurrence, and the degree of asset specificity) that determine level of 
opportunism (Williamson, 1979). Transaction costs fall into three main classifications: 
information costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring costs. Within the framework of 
transaction cost economics (TCE), the supplier-buyer relationships should be 
structured in such a way to minimize the transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1993a, 
b). 
These supplier-buyer relationships or governance modes range from spot market 
relationships, to hybrid governance forms (contracts), to vertical integration or 
hierarchy (Williamson, 1979, 1999). In the context of buyer-supplier exchange 
relationships, buyers have traditionally used unilateral approaches that is, either 
contract bidding (market governance) or administrative fiat (hierarchical governance). 
The trend in governance has been switching toward the adoption of bilateral tools of 
governance (Heide, 1994) that imply the efforts of both exchange partners to limit 
opportunism in cooperation with each other. This bilateral approach to governance 
has been described as long-term relationships, partnerships, and strategic alliances 
(Achrol, 1991), hybrids (Williamson 1991), and relational exchange (Dwyer, Schurr, 
and Oh, 1987), vertical coordination (Stern and Reve, 1980). Alternative means of 
ensure and empower hybrid transactions are trust, reputation, financial hostage 
(Klein, 1980; Dyer, 1996). Such a view is in line with the theoretical reasoning in the 
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negotiations literature (Pruitt, 1981) as well as the transaction cost perspective in 
which trust is an important determinant of long-term hierarchy-like relationships 
(Williamson, 1985).  
Contracting governance  
Contractual governance refers to any agreements reached by parties to reduce risk 
and uncertainty in exchange relationships (Hughes, 1994). Such arrangements will 
tend to reduce the uncertainty that gives rise to high transaction costs. Empirical 
studies support the arguments that standardized contracting is one mean in order to 
overcome the problems of uncertainty (Poole et al, 1998).  
Contract farming is a significant institutional arrangement that facilitates market 
access for smallholders, especially when the transaction costs of direct market 
participation (spot markets) are high for producers and/or traders (Costales and 
Catelo, 2008). Contract farming is a common form of coordination in agro-food value 
chains. The definition of contract farming may vary from country to country 
depending on prevailing circumstances (see FAO 2001; Watts, 1994). In essence, 
there are two main categories of contract farming in Albania: formal contracts and 
informal (verbal) contracts. In general, formal contracts are written contracts (e.g. 
between a farmer and a processing or trade company), whereas informal contracts 
are unwritten, but nevertheless binding agreements (FAO, 2001). The evidence 
suggests that larger farms prefer formal contracts, whereas informal contracts are 
more accommodating to the needs of smallholders (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; 
Grimard, 1997). Bakucs et al. (2010) concludes that formal contractual relationships 
are less frequent when there is little trust in legal enforcement.  
Relational governance  
In the case of weak institutional enforcement, farmers often prefer informal and self-
enforcing arrangements (Jabbar et al, 2008; Bouis and Haddad, 1990). Several 
studies have investigated informal trade arrangements, legally not enforceable, that 
make exchange more efficient revealing a pattern of informal agreements highly 
consistent with TCE (Palay, 1985).  Small farms rely more on reputation mechanisms 
and on network contacts to support reputation mechanisms instead of detailed 
(formal) contracting (Nooteboom, 1999). Trust between the transacting partners is a 
valuable mean when legal enforcement is missing.  
Recent theoretical developments (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Heide and John, 
1992) suggest that “inclusion of the social-context variable of trust in the TCE 
framework will yield a model with greater predictive validity” (Chiles and McMackin, 
1996:88). Dwyer et al. (1987) and Granovetter (1985) argued that transactions are 
embedded and this fact ensures the exchange partners as a safeguard to 
opportunism. Akerlof (1970) discussed economic models in which formal unwritten 
guarantees are important and "trust" between parties lowers uncertainty. Social 
norms and embeddedness (Chiles and McMackin, 1996) and calculative-based trust 
Williamson (1993) associated respectively with moral, personal obligations and 
rational economics are considered the main facets of trust.   
Trust seems to be one important determinant on which Peterson (2001) constructed 
the relation-based alliance as one of exchange relationships (governance mode in 
the vertical coordination continuum) in which the firms share risks and convey on 
mutually identified objectives. Trust is an important component of relational 
governance implying that parties are informally embedded in relationships and social 
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norms.  Based on this relational approach, trust needs to be built in order to eliminate 
ex ante goal divergence and ex post transaction costs through a socialization 
process. Empirical evidence in other agricultural subsectors in Albania confirms the 
beneficial role of trust-based relationships in lowering transaction costs (e.g. Gerdoçi 
et al., 2013). Although such a governance mode can be superior in economizing 
transactions costs it involves significant set up efforts (Grandori, 1987). Hence, the 
tradition in choosing one type of marketing channel versus another can be partly 
related to trust and a long and sometimes rather costly, socialization process.  
The sociological literature focuses only in long socialization process, common values 
and embeddednes, but doesn’t take into account other elements of TCE such 
specific assets for example. Making “credible commitments” to the relationship 
(Williamson 1983, 1985) is one strategy for creating a self-enforcing agreement 
between the parties involved in transaction. An investment in dedicated assets 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992) is a common viable way to support crafting this type of 
relationships. Bilateral relation can be crafted by means of a reciprocal “hostage 
exchange,” in which two parties make “separate but concurrent investments in 
specific assets” (Williamson 1983, p. 532).  
Based on the theoretical background discussed above, we analyse various aspects 
of TCE framework such specific assets, contracting, marketing channels, trust, etc. 
focusing our efforts in defining the governance mode in apple sector.  
 
Method 
This paper is based on a survey targeting orchard farmers specialised in apple 
production. The survey consisted of structured questionnaires, which were designed 
based on an extensive literature review, and consultations and open-ended 
interviews with agricultural economists, scholars and practitioners including various 
food chain actors. The questionnaires were initially tested with selected farmers and 
further improved after testing. The questionnaire intended to collect basic information 
about farm structure and production, farm household characteristics, relations with 
clients and farmer perceptions regarding the enabling environment.  
Table 2: Distribution of sample by interview and farm location 
District Commune Frequency Percent 
Diber 
Arras 1 0.5 
Kastriot 10 5.5 
Maqellare 13 7.1 
Melan 15 8.2 
Muhurr 1 0.5 
Q Tomin 5 2.7 
Sllove 1 0.5 
Tomin 5 2.7 
 
Proger 64 35.2 
Korce 
 
Mollaj 37 20.3 
Pirg 21 11.5 
Other 9 4.9 
Total 182 100 
Source: Field survey 
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The structured survey was carried out during April – May 2013 in the largest orchard 
producing regions in Albania, namely Korçë and Peshkopi. Most interviews were 
carried out in Korça (Table 2) as it is a leading fruit producing area in Albania, 
accounting for more than half of the country’s apple production (GTZ, 2010). Farmers 
were chosen randomly from the existing lists/registers of orchard/apple specialized 
(typically larger) farms in most cases (when such lists were available) and 
interviewed by three trained students. 182 orchard farmers specialised in apple 
production were interviewed. 
As mentioned above, the research (and sampling) strategy aimed at identifying 
relatively large, market-oriented farms. About two thirds of interviewed farmers have 
orchards that are larger than 0.5 Ha. In terms of representativeness, it is estimated 
that the study sample covers a considerable share of larger farms segments. The 
sample includes few small farms (up to 0.2 Ha according to our classification) (Table 
3).  
Table 3: Distribution of the farm population and sample according to orchard size 
Ha 
Population Sample Sample/ 
population Freq. Share Freq. Share 
0 – 0.2 43,086 70.6% 10 5.5% 0.0% 
> 0.2 – 0.3 6,034 9.9% 21 11.5% 0.3% 
> 0.3 – 0.4 4,766 7.8% 12 6.6% 0.3% 
> 0.4 – 0.5 3,115 5.1% 20 11.0% 0.6% 
> 0.5 – 0.75 2,243 3.7% 27 14.8% 1.2% 
> 0.75 – 1 1,321 2.2% 38 20.9% 3.0% 
> 1 – 1.5 449 0.7% 37 20.3% 8.2% 
> 1.5 – 3 36 0.1% 17 9.3% 47.2% 
Total 61,050 100% 182 100.0% 0.3% 
Source: Field survey (for the sample) and Statistical Sector of the Ministry of Agriculture Food and 
Consumer Protection (MAFCP) – data provided upon request (population) 
The survey data were subject to descriptive statistical analyses consisting of 
frequencies and cross-tabulations including Chi Square test. 
Results 
The main distribution channel for apple is the category of local collectors (48%) and 
wholesalers (35%). The other attractive channels are retailers and direct sales to final 
consumers. Other channels appear insignificant (Table 4).  










Source: Field survey 
Category Frequency Percent 
Local collectors 88 48.6 
Wholesalers 63 34.8 
Direct sales 14 7.8 
Retailers 13 7.2 
Exporter 2 1.1 
Processor 1 0.5 
Total 181 100.0 
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As expected, formal (written) contracts are not common. Only one farmer stated his 
engagement into formal contracts with exporter clients. Farmers do not apply formal 
contracts with other types of clients such as wholesalers and retailers. However, 
informal agreements exist – about 20% of the farmers interviewed apply largely 
informal agreements with at least one of the buyer categories (Table 5). Informal 
agreements are more commonly tied with local collectors (26%).  
Table 5: Contracting relations by type of clients 
Category 
Contracting/agrement 




Count  1 1 0 2 
Percentage  50% 50% 0% 100% 
2 
Wholesalers 
Count  0 11 52 63 
Percentage  0% 17% 83% 100% 
3 Local 
collectors 
Count  0 23 65 88 
Percentage  0% 26% 74% 100% 
4 Processor 
Count  0 1 0 1 
Percentage  0% 100% 0% 100% 
5 Retailers 
Count  0 0 13 13 
Percentage  0% 0% 100% 100% 
6 Direct 
sales 
Count  0 0 13 13 
Percentage  0% 0% 100% 100% 
Total 
Count  1 36 143 180 
Percentage  1% 20% 79% 100% 
Chi Square = 0.000                            Source: Field survey 
Farmers were also asked to elaborate on the length of relations with the main buyers 
of each category. Given that they have more stable dealings with local collectors, one 
can conclude that social ties/relations play a factor for enabling longer time relations 
(Table 6).  











one year Undefined 
1 Exporter 
Count  1 0 0 1 2 
Percentage  50% 0% 0% 50% 100% 
2 Wholesalers 
Count  0 8 1 2 11 
Percentage  0% 73% 9% 18% 100% 
3Local 
collectors 
Count  0 19 2 2 23 
Percentage  0% 83% 9% 9% 100% 
4 Processor 
Count  0 0 0 1 1 
Percentage  0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 
Total 
Count  1 27 3 6 37 
Percentage  3% 73% 8% 17% 100% 
Chi Square = 0.000                          Source: Field survey 
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It may be expected that farmers that tend to sell to the same clients are also more 
likely to engage in some form of contracting, and vice –versa. Selling to the same 
clients requires and enables building up of trust, which also serves as a prerequisite 
for engagement in (informal) contracts (Table 7).  
Table 7: Contract and length of relations within each of the customer categories 
Category 
Contract/agrement 
Total Writen Unwriten 
No 
contract 
Same Count 1 32 59 92 
Percentage 1% 35% 64% 1.0 
Different Count 0 4 58 62 
Percentage 0% 6% 94% 1.0 
Total 
Count 1 36 117 154 
Percentage 1% 23% 76% 1.0 
Chi Square = 0.000              Source: Field survey 
Survey data reveal that farmers usually sell to the same buyer; slightly less than 60% 
of farmers sell to the same buyer and the rest sell to different buyers.  
Table 8: Stability in business relations 
Category   
 




92 62 154 
59.7% 40.3% 100% 
Source: Field survey 
Reasons for selling to the same buyer – at an order of importance based on the 
number or response rates – are secure market, trust, secure and quick payment, and 
fairer product prices (Table 9).  
Table 9: Reasons for selling to the same buyer 
Category  Frequency Category  Frequency 
Secure market 71 
Secure and quick 
payment 55 
Trust 68 Short distance 15 
Fairer prices 56 Other 12 
Source: Field survey 
The method and timing of payment and ordering are important indicators of the value 
chain operation and governance, and are related to transaction costs.  
In the case of wholesalers, most farmers state that wholesalers order their products 
up to one day in advance. Whereas in the case of local collectors, most orders are 
done one week or one month in advance (Table 10). These findings are in line with 
the nature of relations with each type of client group – this study clearly distinguishes 
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the emerging and important role of the local collectors in the value chain governance. 
These findings are also in line with the nature of relations with each type of client 
group.  











0 0 0 0 0 6 6 
One day 0 32 14 0 7 8 61 
One week 1 18 45 1 4 0 69 
One 
month 
1 7 23 0 2 0 33 
Other 0 6 6 0 0 0 12 
Total 2 63 88 1 13 14 181 
Source: Field survey 
Cash payment is the prevalent form of payment –bank payments encountered only in 
two cases (Table 11). These findings not a surprise, given the lack of formal 
contracts on one hand (which logically would be more likely associated with bank 
channel payment), and, on the other hand, the fact that Albanian economy has a high 
level of informality and is considered a “cash economy” at large (in Albania it is 
common that transactions are carried outside the banking system (Bank of Albania, 
2004).  




  Exporter Wholesalers 
Local 





0 0 0 0 0 6 6 
Cash 1 63 87 1 13 8 173 
Bank  1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
 Total 2 63 88 1 13 14 181 
Source: Field survey 
Most farmers obtain payment within a week from the category of wholesalers (Table 
12). Regarding the client category of local collectors, most farmers wait more than 1 
week – almost half wait for more than a month. One can conclude that the existence 
of trust with local collectors (being part of the same local community) creates the 




Gërdoçi  et al.: Relational Governance – An Examination Of The Apple Sector In Albania
 











0 0 0 0 0 6 6 
On spot 
up to one 
week 
1 47 23 1 11 7 90 
One week 
up to one 
month 





1 5 26 0 0 1 33 
3 months 
up to one 
year 
0 4 16 0 1 0 21 
More than 
one year 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 2 63 88 1 13 14 181 
Source: Field survey 
Farmers were also asked about the methods that buyers use to control product (fruit) 
quality (before buying). Field observation seems to the main means for controlling the 
quality of the product (Table 13).  






collectors Processor Retailers 
Direct 
sales 
No answer 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 
Advance 
field visit 





0 23 1 0 8 6 38 
Personal 
belif 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Other 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 
Total 2 63 88 1 13 14 181 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
This study constitutes a descriptive examination of the behaviour and relations of 
Albanian fruit farms with other downstream actors. Particular attention is paid to the 
types of relations between agricultural producers and marketing channel chosen by 
them, distinguishing between big wholesalers, local collectors and exporters, longer-
term relations, commitment and trust, and contracting along the value chain. Given 
the absence of, or weak, contract enforcement and the clear evidence of 
embeddedness in dyadic relationships in this chain we focused our analysis on 
contracting (see Fertő and Szabo, 2002) and personal bonds as a determinant factor 
to improve business relationship quality (see Granovetter, 1985; Dwyer et al., 1987).  
In contrast to Imami et al (2013), who have analysed before the issue of value chain 
governance in the orchard sector in Albania, this study distinguishes between 
(ordinary) wholesalers and local collectors (who also act as wholesalers but with a 
different nature of relations) – and indeed there are obvious relational differences 
between relationships of farmers with these two types of buyers. Given the fast 
dynamic changes of the agro-food chain in Albania, this study reflects the latest 
trends (the survey was conducted in spring 2013) as compared to Imami et al (2013) 
which were based on a survey developed in 2010. 
The survey confirmed that formal (written) contracts are not common in the Albanian 
fruit sector – only one surveyed farmer is engaged in formal contracts. However, 
informal agreements are common although, they sometimes do not imply any well-
established relationship.  The survey and in-depth interviews revealed that the most 
important exchange partner for apple orchard farmers is the local collector or cold 
storage owner/operator confirming a shift in apple sector development. The important 
investment in cold storage facilities has made apple cold storage operators an 
important factor which will – most probably - pay a structuring role in apple sectors 
for the years to come. 
The level of relationship sustainability between farmers and buyers seems to be a 
better predictor of governance modes. Mature relationships have the advantage of 
experience on what to expect from a partner. By comparing methods used to inspect 
farm production, we evidence that in embedded relationship (farmer-local collector 
channel) buyers rely much more in field visits (roughly 99% of cases) than in other 
relationships (57%, in the farmer-wholesaler channel) suggesting a higher level of 
cooperation and commitment; time of payment is much longer in embedded 
relationships (74%, later than one week) compared to the main alternative channel 
(26%, later than one week) suggesting a higher level of trust. The same pattern can 
be observed regarding advance payment. These facts highlight the role of repeated 
exchange and embeddeness in motivating long-term cooperation, because 
opportunistic behaviour may undermine the longevity of the relationship as 
suggested by economic models of relational governance (Klein, 1996). Both sides 
have enough time to develop personal bonds and commit to each other. As noted by 
North and Weingast (1989), countries without an enforceable system of property 
rights cannot rely on contracts to enforce expectations and promises. The agricultural 
sector in Albania lacks a cultural and legal commitment to the use of formal 
contracts. Even the so-called “verbal contracts” don’t ensure any type of safeguard. 
Most farmers state that the main reason for which they do not use formal contracts is 
that their clients do not prefer or they don’t see any benefit in contracting.  
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By the other side, the main reasons for selling to the same buyer comply with trust 
facets as many behaviour and sociologist suggest. Secure market (antecedent of 
trust), trust, secure payment, and fairer product prices (honesty) are related to trust 
dimensions giving credit to sociologists arguing that interactions embedded within 
close ties will yield economic gains and sustainable relationships (e.g., Granovetter, 
1985).  
The survey showed a weak prevalence of verbal contracts in embedded 
relationships.  The percentage of contracts between farmers and local collectors is 
slightly higher than the same ratio between farmers and wholesalers. This evidence 
is much stronger when we investigate the incidence of contracts in stable 
relationships (same buyer). We also find that mature relationships generate higher 
sustainability a result which does not come as a surprise, although the coordination 
between farmers and other actors downstream is only at early stages. 
The main implications, which arise from our analysis, are mostly for agribusiness, 
farmers and policy makers. In order to enhance the sustainability of business 
relationships, trust, coordination and reliability are to be considered important 
determinants for relational governance. As the level of trust increases, partners can 
mitigate uncertainty (Luhmann, 1989) and pay more attention to coordination 
concerns. Buyers should also try to foster personal bonds with their main suppliers 
building the necessary trust that serves as a moral safeguard to the relationship. 
Relational contracting diminishes the role of asset specialization as a sufficient 
condition for high transaction costs in the market (Mellewigta, et.al. 2007). 
As the agro-food value chain is expected to change substantially in the coming years 
in Albania, due to the fact that the share of supermarkets in the retail sector and 
export is expected to increase significantly in number and volume, the network in 
apple sector will change substantially. These factors may increase network centrality 
of wholesalers and local collectors strengthening their role in the supply chain. 
Contractual and relational arrangements, such as partnerships that aim to achieve 
greater vertical coordination (see Hughes, 1994) can tackle uncertainty and reduce 
transaction costs in an environment that poses such challenges for both farmers and 
intermediaries. Strengthening law enforcement institutions is needed in order to 
enable a favourable environment for contracting (for farmers, wholesalers, retailers 
and processors).  
In-depth interviews confirmed that vertical chain organization works better when 
actors downstream work with groups of farmers rather than with individual farmers. In 
this context, any government or donor agency intervention may consider establishing 
public private partnerships – key value chain actors (local collectors, exporters) and 
farmers assisted in groups by public extension service - with the objective of 
strengthening both vertical cooperation and cooperation among farmers.  
In conclusion, despite the limitations associated with the descriptive nature of the 
research, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the relationship 
between farmers and buyer, channels adopted and determinants that might explain 
the governance modes investigated. Further in-depth analyses using a different 
approach and applying appropriate models will give a deeper inside of transaction 
hazards and relationship between trust antecedents and facets, specific assets, 
uncertainty and competition both downstream and upstream with hybrid governance 
modes.  
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